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ABSTRACT 
 
Research Summary: When describing the future, executives draw analogies between time and 
space (“we’re on the right path,” “the deadline is approaching”). These analogies shape how 
executives construe the future and influence attitudes to action with long-term benefits but 
short-term costs. Ego-moving frames (“we are approaching the future”) prompt a focus on the 
present whereas time-moving frames (“the future is approaching”) underscores the advent of 
the future as inevitable. Ultimately, action that prioritizes long-term returns depends both on 
how executives conceive of the future and whether they believe they can engender favorable 
outcomes. This balance between recognizing the inevitability of the future (time-moving 
frame) and the capacity to shape outcomes (control beliefs) stands in contrast to the more 
agentic forms of discourse that are dominant in strategy.  
 
Managerial Summary: Executives often prioritize maximizing immediate returns over 
investing to build a long-term competitive advantage. How they think about the future offers 
one explanation for this short-termism. This paper distinguishes two ways of framing the 
future with implications for decision-making. Are we approaching the future (the ego-moving 
frame), or is it approaching us (the time-moving frame)? As long as executives have 
confidence in their ability to achieve forecasted results, they focus on long-term returns in 
their decision-making when they recognize the advent of the future as inevitable (the time-
moving frame). In contrast, though executives often use the ego-moving frame to show that 
they are active agents, they weigh future returns less heavily when framing the future in this 
way.  
 
 
Forthcoming in the Strategic Management Journal  
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When corporate executives talk about the future, they routinely employ the vocabulary of 
space and motion. For instance, “to accelerate performance improvement,” Procter & Gamble 
is “taking an important strategic step forward” (Lafley, 2014), while Pfizer is “on the right 
path” and “continues to move forward to having a pipeline that is both robust and 
sustainable” (Read, 2014). Using spatial language to describe the future is not incidental. The 
physical realities of space and motion help people conceive of intangible constructs, such as 
time (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Linguistics research points to two distinct ways of 
experiencing time (Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002): the time-moving frame, in which the 
future ‘happens’ and moves towards the speaker (e.g., “the deadline is approaching”), and the 
ego-moving frame, in which an agentic speaker moves towards the future (e.g. “we are 
approaching the deadline”).  
How executives construe the future is a core issue for strategy. Firms often face a 
tension between managing short-term earnings and investing for the long term (Litov, 
Moreton, and Zenger 2012). Spatiotemporal language—despite featuring prominently in 
corporate discourse—has remained under the radar of strategy scholars. The dominant 
explanations in strategy as to why executives prioritize the short- or long-term consequences 
of their decisions rest on incentives (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006). Nonetheless, 
executives adopt short-term strategies even when long-term compensation plans are in place 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Executives do not always respond rationally to 
incentives, and there is good reason to delve deeper into the subjective, constructed nature of 
time and its implications for economic decisions (Bluedorn, 2002; Kaplan and Orlikowski, 
2013). Analogies between time and space are one important way through which time is 
constructed in the mind.  
In this paper, I ask: Do analogies between time and space reflect, and even influence, 
how executives address the trade-off between the short and long term? Field evidence in 
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linguistics associates time-moving frames with greater conscientiousness and attention to 
pending events than ego-moving frames (Duffy, Feist, and McCarthy, 2014). In essence, the 
future seems to loom larger when it ‘happens’ to us. However, the time-moving frame risks a 
sense of fatalism. Strategy scholars note that a sense of agency—in particular, the perception 
that one can actively influence events and their outcomes—prompts long-term planning and 
action (Hodgkinson, 1992). As Bandura (2000: 120) contends, “Unless people believe that 
they can produce desired effects and forestall undesired ones by their actions, they have little 
incentive to act.” Thus, I argue that corporate executives prioritize projects with long-term 
returns both when they recognize the advent of the future as inevitable (the time-moving 
frame) and when they trust their ability to achieve forecasted results (control beliefs). 
Temporal framing and control beliefs are simultaneously important in influencing how 
managers address the trade-off between the short- and long-term.  
I conduct a mixed methods study. The first study sheds light on firms’ use of spatial 
language in their calls with analysts and informs propositions, which I investigate in 
subsequent studies involving managers and finance professionals. I assess whether time- and 
ego-moving temporal frames are associated with different orientations towards the future 
(Study 2) and link frames and control beliefs to decision-making in the face of a trade-off 
between short-and long-term returns (Study 3). A supplementary study highlights that 
investors are similarly sensitive to the way in which the future is framed. Investors support 
long-term strategies when these are communicated using language that underscores the 
advent of the future (time-moving frame) as well as the capacity of the firm to shape future 
outcomes (control beliefs).   
The contribution is an understanding of intertemporal choice in strategy that 
illustrates the role of spatial cognition in addressing the tension between the present and the 
future. Spatial language reflects and structures perceptions of the future in concert with other 
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psychological attributes. The implications are provocative both for managerial decision-
making and for communicating with the markets. Whereas strategy discourse conventionally 
emphasizes the agency of the firm, agentic discourse has to be counterbalanced with an 
understanding that the advent of the future looms large.  
SPATIAL PERCEPTION AND TIME CONSTRUAL 
Imagine that a meeting originally scheduled for next Wednesday is moved forward two days. 
On which day will it now take place? When this question is put to English speakers, 
approximately 50% answer “Monday”, whilst 50% answer “Friday” (Ramscar, Matlock, and 
Dye, 2010). Ambiguity arises because people conceptualize space and time in different ways, 
leading to divergent understandings of what “moving forward” means when used in relation 
to time. Monday answers occur when respondents interpret the question through a time-
moving frame: Moving the meeting forward means it moves closer to the listener. Friday 
answers occur when respondents interpret the question through an ego-moving frame: 
Moving the meeting forward means rescheduling it to a later period because the self (or, ego) 
moves through time and the meeting is displaced a further two days ahead of the self 
(McGlone and Harding, 1998).  
The discipline of cognitive linguistics concerns itself with the psychological processes 
which underlie the production of language. Metaphors help people conceive of abstract 
constructs (e.g. time) in terms of objects that they experience concretely (e.g. space) 
(Levinson, 2003). Analogies between time and space exist in almost all cultures (Sinha et al., 
2011) and are expressed in figurative language, e.g. “time flies,” “we’re heading towards 
bankruptcy.” These mappings between time and space may be hard-wired in the brain. For 
instance, people construe time differently when they are moving than standing still 
(Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002). Similarly, imagining far distances makes people 
overestimate durations (Kim, Zauberman, and Bettman, 2012). 
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The analogies that map time to space are known as temporal frames of reference 
(Evans, 2013). Speakers can use either a time-moving frame or an ego-moving frame to 
convey similar content (Gentner et al., 2002), as shown below.  
(1) The end of the financial year is approaching. [Time-moving frame] 
(2) We’re approaching the end of the financial year. [Ego-moving frame] 
In the first sentence, the speaker conceives of time as moving towards him or her. In a 
time line where the future is depicted to the right of the speaker, the time-moving frame is 
represented by events moving from right to left (Figure 1). In the second sentence, the 
speaker (or ‘ego’) is moving towards a point in time. In a time line, the ego moves from left 
to right. That the same future event can be described using either frame reinforces the fluidity 
of temporal frames (Ramscar et al., 2010). Contextual cues lead people to switch frames 
(Hauser, Carter, and Meier, 2009).  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
For strategy researchers, the important question is: Do temporal frames of reference 
influence intertemporal choice? Evidence from linguistics hints that time- and ego-moving 
frames may be associated with assigning different values to future outcomes. Using field 
studies, Duffy and colleagues (2014) find that people who interpret information through a 
time-moving frame show greater conscientiousness and less procrastination than those who 
interpret the same information through an ego-moving lens. They undertake unpleasant tasks 
in the present. In contrast, people who apply the ego-moving frame appear later for 
appointments. They also complete unpleasant tasks close to, or after, deadlines. Relegating 
unpleasant tasks to the future implies a present time perspective.  
Time-moving frames potentially make future events loom larger than do ego-moving 
frames. When time is perceived as moving (“the future is approaching”), future events are 
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moved forward into the present. The image of an event approaching suggests that it will 
strike head on and ought to be taken seriously (Hsee et al., 2014). Future rewards will weigh 
heavily. In contrast, when the ego is moving through time (“I am approaching the future”), 
future tasks are simultaneously moved forward into the future (Duffy and Feist, 2014). As 
Nuñez, Motz, and Teuscher (2006: 135) note, future events stay ahead of the ego in ego-
moving frames. “If … the Ego is conceived as moving “forward” through time, then future 
events are farther ahead relative to the Ego’s motion” and thus appear distant to the ego. In 
this way, future events may be less salient (Hsee et al., 2014).  
Control beliefs  
Managerial agency is important to future-oriented action. Strategy is characterized by 
decisions whose outcomes can be influenced by managers. Without confidence that their 
actions will produce the desired results, managers have limited interest to make costly 
investments with uncertain returns (see Bandura, 2000; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez, 
1989). Seemingly, human agency is represented differently in ego- and time-moving frames. 
The ego-moving frame depicts the person as agentic and actively approaching the future, 
whereas time is the actor in the time-moving frame (Carver, 2006).  
Within strategy research, locus of control is an established construct that relates to the 
sense of agency (Hodgkinson, 1992). Specifically, locus of control is “the degree to which 
persons expect that a reinforcement or an outcome of their behavior is contingent on their 
own behavior or personal characteristics (internal) versus the degree to which persons expect 
that the reinforcement or outcome is a function of chance, luck, or fate, is under the control of 
powerful others, or is simply unpredictable (external)” (Rotter 1990: 489).  
Control beliefs matter for future-oriented strategies because they influence 
opportunity evaluation and goal-oriented behavior. An internal locus of control prompts 
approach (e.g., making an investment in the belief of being able to influence its outcome) 
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rather than withdrawal (e.g., rejecting an investment with uncertain returns) (Kramer and 
Yoon, 2007). Decision-makers with an internal locus have confidence to achieve success and 
readily go after opportunities, whereas an external locus magnifies uncertainty as decision-
makers view outcomes as dependent on the external environment. An internal locus predicts 
long-term decision-making and is associated with overriding impulses for immediate rewards 
(Lasane and Jones, 1999; Platt and Eisenman, 1968). Actors with an internal locus save more 
than peers with an external locus (Lunt and Livingstone, 1991).  
However, research has not always found a consistent link between locus of control 
and future-oriented decisions (Plunkett and Buehner, 2007): the precise effect of control 
beliefs is contingent upon other individual-level and contextual factors. Temporal frames may 
be one such factor. Individuals using the ego-moving frame report a high sense of agency 
(Richmond, Wilson and Zinken, 2012). This is understandable because the ego in the ego-
moving frame actively approaches the future. Presumably, executives also believe that they 
convey agency when employing ego-moving language in their reports. Yet, evidence reveals 
the time-moving frame to be associated with prioritizing action in contrast to the ego-moving 
frame which moves events forward into the future and causes them to be postponed (Duffy 
and Feist, 2014). Thus, if strategy scholars are interested in understanding long-termism, 
examining control beliefs in isolation is insufficient. Rather, it is important to consider both 
the saliency of future events to the decision-maker and his/her control beliefs in concert. The 
research program is designed with this goal in mind. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Three studies shed light on how temporal frames of reference are used in practice (Study 1), 
how they are associated with intertemporal choice (Study 2), and whether any relationship 
between temporal frames and decision-making is potentially causal (Study 3). Research in 
linguistics often observes group- and macro-level phenomena qualitatively whereas micro-
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level attributes can be readily captured quantitatively (Dörnyei, 2007). I employ an initial 
qualitative study to inform the subsequent quantitative studies.   
STUDY 1. ARCHIVAL STUDY 
A strong link exists between discourse and cognition (Duriau, Reger, and Pfarrer, 2007), with 
executives’ conception of time reflected in their discourse (Slawinski and Bansal, 2012). I 
undertook textual analysis 1) to identify how managers use ego- and time-moving language 
when describing future intentions, and 2) to establish propositions about how ego- and time-
moving forms of language map to ways of construing the future.  
Sample and Data 
The sample consists of 10 U.S. pharmaceutical companies consistently covered by the rating 
agency Innovest, part of MSCI ESG Research, from 2002. Additional data are sourced from 
Thomson Reuters Asset 4 and Thomson Reuters StreetEvents. The pharmaceutical sector is 
characterized by pressures for short-term performance (e.g. selling existing products and 
generic drugs) as well as pressures to invest in sources of long-term growth (e.g. research into 
new drugs). The sector provides “polar types” of cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007: 27). 
There are two ideal-type business models: one, as represented by firms such as Eli Lilly, 
involves research to build a future competitive advantage, and another, as represented by 
Mylan, involves producing and selling generics to gain a present competitive advantage. As 
an example of short-term orientation, during the observation period (2002-2011), Mylan 
raised the prices of some drugs by 2,600% and 3,200% despite long-term consequences for 
its relationships with stakeholders. 
Though temporal orientation cannot be directly observed, it is possible to identify 
future-oriented behaviors. The Asset4 data base provides financial data, such as research and 
development spend, as well as data relating to how firms address long-term social issues 
(Bansal and DesJardine, 2014). Some pharmaceutical firms spend consistently around 15% of 
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their revenues on R&D and gain high scores for their responses to long-term social issues, 
whilst others spend 3-10% of their revenues on R&D and gain poor scores for their responses 
to the same issues.   
The StreetEvents data base includes transcribed earnings calls with analysts. These 
calls are apt for the current research endeavor. First, their aim is to review performance and to 
look ahead. The calls are used in accounting to identify short- and long-term thinking (Li, 
2010). Second, the calls include a prepared section as well as unscripted responses to queries 
so that the language reflects actual thinking more than corporate reports would. Third, 
multiple management team members, including the CEO and CFO, participate. The calls help 
to identify whether team members construe the future in the same way. For each firm and 
year from 2002 to 2011, I collected the fourth quarter call transcriptions from StreetEvents. 
Fourth quarter calls were most likely to include content relating to the coming year and 
further ahead. Transcriptions were unavailable for six firm-year observations, leading to 94 
transcriptions in total. Each document comprises on average 10,739 words.   
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
Table 1 depicts the firms in descending order of R&D/revenue ratio and also provides 
their Asset4 social performance score (out of 100). The Asset4 social performance score is a 
composite index which reflects how well firms respond to long-term issues across seven 
issues (employment quality, health and safety, training and development, diversity, human 
rights, community, and product responsibility). High social performance is positively 
correlated with future orientation (Flammer and Bansal, 2017). To the extent that behavior 
reveals something about temporal orientation, the topmost firms have the strongest future 
orientation, and the bottom firms have a stronger present orientation. 
Protocol 
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Two researchers, one of whom was blind to the purpose of the study, independently read the 
transcriptions, carefully tagging all references to the future. They isolated references that also 
involved spatial language and noted whether the references involved ego-motion or time-
motion. Cohen’s kappa was 0.662, indicating substantial inter-rater agreement (Landis and 
Koch, 1977). This left a total of 674 ego- or time-moving mentions of the future. The same 
researchers analyzed the tagged sections, identifying how language was used in context. 
Consistent with the overview, particular (but not exclusive) attention was paid to how 
executives described the external environment and its controllability. Analysis uncovered two 
themes: the use of time-moving frames to denote the distant future, and differences in the 
modality of language (specifically, how some executives used time-moving frames to 
describe constraints whereas others used similar frames also to describe choices).  
Results 
The analysis reveals two dimensions that govern the use of ego-moving and time-moving 
forms of language. First, the ego-moving frame is largely used to express the near future, 
whereas the time-moving frame is frequently used to express distant events. Second, though 
the ego-moving frame is mainly used to describe events that are likely or under the firm’s 
control, executives in some firms also use time-moving frames to articulate strategic choice.    
Spatial language and the short- versus long-run 
Time-moving frames were frequently used to express events in the distant future whereas 
ego-moving frames were largely used to express the near future.  
Building a robust pipeline and transforming our business both to excel in an 
increasingly challenging health care environment, as well as to prepare for the patent 
expirations coming in the next decade. (Eli Lilly, CEO, 2008, using a time-moving 
frame) 
 
We’ll continue to develop those (supply chain efficiencies) as the years move along. 
We’re early in that process. (Johnson & Johnson, CFO, 2011, using a time-moving 
frame) 
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Humira (is) a true pipeline… with five additional low-risk high-reward opportunities 
coming over the next three to four years. (Abbott, Pharmaceutical Products Group, 
2005, using a time-moving frame) 
 
Our primary focus in the near future will be to drive our business. (Mylan, CEO, 2008, 
using an ego-moving frame) 
 
Once we get through these short term challenges… (Hospira, CEO, 2011, using an ego-
moving frame) 
 
 
I followed the approach of Brochet, Loumioti, and Serafeim (2013) to identify 
whether this pattern was systematic. In the accounting literature, short-term denotes time 
horizons shorter than a year, and long-term refers to horizons of a year or longer. References 
to periods below one year (e.g. “month,” “quarter”) were flagged as short-term. Mentions of 
periods of one year or longer (e.g. “years ahead,” “next decade”) were flagged as long-term. 
Occasions where frames were used without an explicit horizon (e.g., “We are entering a new 
phase”) were noted1. Excluding references of indeterminate duration, 278 references of ego- 
and time-moving language were explicitly linked to the short-term (less than one year) or 
long-term (one year or longer). Of these 278 references, 19.23% of the ego-moving, and 
38.54% of the time-moving, references were linked to the long term. The greater propensity 
for time-moving language to be linked to the long-term is significant (χ2 (1) = 12.212, p = 
0.000). Time-moving frames are thus associated with long horizons, that have been shown to 
characterize future-oriented strategies (Das, 1987; Nadkarni, Chen, and Chen, 2015). 
The prevalence of ego-moving and time-moving language differs. Firms with high 
R&D/sales ratios have a higher incidence of the time-moving frame. In Figure 2, I plot firms 
by their mean ratio of R&D spend to revenue over the period 2002 to 2011 (scaled to 1 
reflecting the highest mean, namely Eli Lilly of 19.73%) and their ratio of time- to ego-
moving language (likewise, scaled to 1, which reflects the use of 0.56 times as much time- as 
                                                          
1
 Whereas Brochet et al. code “looking forward” as long-term, I code it as of indeterminate length unless it is 
qualified by a specific period (e.g. “looking forward into 2012,” “looking forward into the next quarter”).  
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ego-moving language). On balance, executives in firms that invest in R&D in the hope of 
gaining future benefits use more time-moving language. Merck is an outlier
2
.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
On average, CFOs use ego-moving language about 24% more frequently than CEOs. 
Plausibly, CFOs focus on predicting near-term results, whereas CEOs often refer to longer-
term strategies. That said, generally executives from the same firm show similar inclination 
to use time-moving frames, thus providing some support for the idea of temporal norms 
within firms. Across the 10 firms, the intraclass correlation between the CEO’s ratio of time-
moving to ego-moving language and that of his peers is 0.644 (p = 0.077), which suggests 
some convergence across members of the same team (see Cicchetti, 1994). 
Thus, time-moving language is comparatively more likely than ego-moving language 
to describe the long-term. Though the evidence does not show a causal relationship, it is 
consistent with the assumption of a stronger association between the long-term future and 
time-moving frames than ego-moving frames. A future event articulated in an ego-moving 
frame can appear distant. This occurs because future events stay ahead of decision-makers in 
ego-moving frames (Nuñez et al., 2006). When a future event is depicted as the agent in the 
time-moving frame, it may be attended to (see Carrasco, Ling, and Read, 2004), making its 
approach appear faster (Turatto, Vescovi, and Valsecchi, 2007). 
Based on this reasoning, I establish the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. The use of the ego-moving frame will be associated with a stronger 
focus on the short-term than the use of the time-moving frame.   
 
Spatial language and modality 
                                                          
2
 A plausible explanation is that Merck was under the shadow of litigation owing to the cardiovascular risks 
linked to Vioxx. These risks became public in 2002, and the product was suspended in 2004. Merck made a 
legal settlement of $4.85 billion in 2007 and made a subsequent settlement in 2008. The firm’s long-standing 
research focus co-existed with a need to sustain its survival. Facing threats, managers focus attention on 
immediate issues that can be controlled (see Dutton and Jackson, 1987). 
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A second finding relates to the modality of time-space analogies. At its most basic, modality 
represents attitudes towards the world and encompasses certainty, possibility, necessity, and 
ability. Where time is concerned, modality denotes whether events appear as real, likely, 
and/or within the speaker’s influence (Jasczolt, 2013). Time-moving language is often used to 
express uncertain events, whereas ego-moving language is more often used to express events 
over which the firm has influence. In numerous firms, speakers use the ego-moving frame to 
express commitments and confidence in achieving objectives.  
Altima is off to a strong start with worldwide sales in 2004. (Eli Lilly, IR manager, 
2004) 
 
We’re going down a good path and pleased with the progress, and I think we’ll 
continue to move down a good path. (Pfizer, CFO, 2011) 
 
We will be able to accelerate the growth going out beyond that. (Johnson & Johnson, 
CEO, 2005). 
 
We expect to move aggressively forward to meet with the FDA and EMEA to discuss 
our plans. (Alexion, CEO, 2005).  
  
My commitment to meet the earnings projects is of the utmost importance… Because 
of that, you can only imagine that the way I’m approaching Mylan’s generic biologics 
entrance is obviously going to take that into consideration. (Mylan, CEO, 2008).  
  
In contrast, time-moving language is often linked to uncertainty. Executives 
frequently use time-moving language to describe events, whose outcomes and timing cannot 
be controlled. Being confronted by unpredictability is summed up by Perrigo’s CEO (2005) 
who describes “the uncontrollable outside factors that are hitting us this year.” Other 
executives use similar language to express dependence on external circumstances.  
We can never predict what circumstances and variables that we as management and the 
board of directors would have to be faced with at the time an approval would come. 
(Mylan, CEO, 2003) 
 
I don’t know I really want to make too many comments specifically on the consumer 
healthcare quarterly sales guidance… because we don’t know when cough, cold, flu 
season will hit. We find it to be turbulent. (Perrigo, CEO, 2009) 
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This evidence seems to equate time-moving language with an external locus of 
control and ego-moving language with an internal locus. Yet, particularly in R&D-intensive 
firms, time-moving frames are also used to express choice and long-term opportunities. The 
modality of ability is present as executives declare their actions to prepare for eventualities 
and suggest that uncertainty will be resolved with positive consequences for the firm. 
There’s going to come a time when… certainly share repurchase is something we’d be 
considering. (Abbott, 2002)  
 
Building a robust pipeline and transforming our business both to excel in an 
increasingly challenging health care environment, as well as to prepare for the patent 
expirations coming in the next decade. (CEO, Eli Lilly, 2008) 
 
Further, even when outcomes are in the hands of external parties, they are frequently 
not depicted in the fatalistic terms as used by the CEOs of Perrigo and Hospira. Notably, 
when Eli Lilly’s Director of Investor Relations mentions “product decision(s) coming up,” he 
is silent on whether the decision is in the hands of the FDA or Eli Lilly itself.  
We will be increasing our spending in discovery... We have a number of products 
potentially going into Phase III with product decisions this year… Those would be 
Arzoxifene, CS-747, possibly PPAR modulator, it has a product decision coming up 
in the next few months, as well as Endostorin for non-Hodgkins Lymphoma, which 
also has a product decision coming up some time this year. (Eli Lilly, 2003, Director 
IR) 
 
 In sum, whilst executives in firms that prioritize short-term concerns overwhelmingly 
use time-moving frames to denote uncertainty, executives in other firms use time-moving 
frames also to represent ability and their influence over the external environment. This 
finding suggests that time-moving frames do not necessarily imply low control beliefs (cf. 
Richmond et al, 2012). The activity/passivity of the actor (as in Figure 1) may be distinct 
from conventional understandings in strategy of agency and control.  
Even if control beliefs do not map directly to time- and ego-moving language, they 
are central to strategy. Control beliefs represent a proclivity to action, and an internal locus of 
control often prompts future-oriented decisions (Lasane and Jones, 1999). Arguably, when 
combined with a time-moving frame, which makes future events appear salient, perceptions 
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that the environment is controllable prompt long-term decisions. Notably, any effect of locus 
of control is likely to be a moderation effect rather than a mediation. Locus of control is 
considered dispositional (Bono and Judge, 2003)
3
, and hence invoking an ego- or time-
moving frame should not alter the locus of control. Rather, the influence of the frame in 
provoking future-oriented decisions will depend on the individual’s inherent locus of control. 
Whereas temporal frames of reference make future events more or less salient to 
decision-makers, control beliefs are more likely to influence the propensity to act by altering 
the perceived pay-offs. Thus, an internal locus, typically associated with the positive 
evaluation of opportunities, is likely to amplify the attractiveness of future-oriented decisions 
prompted by time-moving frames. Managers with an external locus, i.e. the belief that 
outcomes depend on chance or external circumstances, may be less inclined to make long-
term investments because they err on the side of caution when estimating the returns.  
Based on this reasoning, I establish the following proposition.  
Proposition 2. Decision-makers’ control beliefs moderate the influence of temporal 
frames in prompting a long-term focus in strategic decisions. An internal locus of control will 
positively moderate the influence of time-moving temporal frames on strategic decisions.  
 
STUDY 2: FRAMES, LOCUS OF CONTROL, AND INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 
Building on the analysis above, I devise a study to assess the relationship between temporal 
frames of reference, locus of control, and intertemporal choice. Subsequently, I test the 
combined influence of temporal frames and control beliefs on intertemporal choice in the 
context of a strategic decision.  
Participants and design 
I partnered with Qualtrics Panels to recruit 176 business managers (43.75% females; mean 
age = 46.30 years, standard deviation = 12.33). All were resident in the USA and were native 
speakers of English. Qualtrics Panels has access to more targeted subject pools than 
                                                          
3
 There is some evidence that control beliefs about specific issues – rather than a general sense of control - can 
be influenced (Mittal and Ross, 1998), and I exploit this in a supplementary study A1 (online material). 
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conventional laboratory studies (Crilly, Ni, and Jiang, 2016). 46.03% of the managers were 
CEOs, directors, or senior managers. 80.11% had a university degree, and 23.86% had a 
postgraduate qualification. 
Subjects responded to an online survey. Consistent with prior research (Boroditsky 
and Ramscar, 2002), to identify frames of reference, subjects first answered the question: “A 
meeting arranged for next Wednesday has been moved forward two days. What day is the 
meeting now that it has been rescheduled?” As discussed above, Monday responses reflect a 
time-moving frame (i.e. the sentence is interpreted to mean that the meeting is moved closer). 
Friday responses reflect an ego-moving frame (i.e. people perceive themselves as moving 
forward and interpret the sentence to mean that the meeting date is moved two days further 
ahead). I created a dummy variable (1 = ego-moving frame, and 0 = time-moving frame).  
Subsequently, subjects completed a matching task. The matching task is an 
established way of measuring intertemporal choice that predicts behavior in the face of trade-
offs between short- and long-term returns (Hardisty et al., 2013; Loewenstein et al., 2003). In 
the task, subjects indicate how much money they would need to receive after 1, 5, 10, and 20 
years instead of receiving $1,000 tomorrow. The points of indifference can be converted into 
discount rates over the various time intervals. Assessing multiple points of indifference 
allows for dynamically inconsistent time preferences (Thaler, 1981) because people do not 
discount the future at a constant rate per unit of time (Souder and Bromiley, 2012). 
Participants who indicated that they preferred to receive less than $1,000 in the future were 
excluded for fear that they had misunderstood the question. 12 participants were in this 
category, resulting in 164 responses to be analyzed. 
To control quality, the survey included attention filters. At intermittent points, people 
were asked to reproduce random text (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko, 2009). 
Subjects’ locus of control was measured using Rotter’s (1966) scale as well as Hodgkinson’s 
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(1992) strategic locus of control scale. I also collected demographic information (hierarchy in 
the firm, measured on a 1-4 scale, whereby 1 represented lower management, 2 middle 
management, 3 higher management, and 4 C-level executive; and education, measured on a 
1-4 scale, whereby 1 represented no high school graduation, 2 high school graduation, 3 
university degree, and 4 postgraduate degree).   
Results 
Of the analyzed responses, 90 subjects (54.88%) answered Monday, and 74 (45.12%) 
answered Friday. In the matching test, there is no upper bound so that mean values can be 
thrown off kilter by outliers (Frederick et al., 2002; Hardisty et al., 2013). To exclude outlier 
influence, I winsorized the data at the 97
th
 percentile. The winsorized mean values are shown 
in Figure 3. After 1 year, Monday (time-moving frame) respondents would need $2,130.59 in 
place of $1,000 today, whereas Friday (ego-moving frame) respondents would need 
$3,415.47. This gap rises to $6,415.76 versus $10,233.50 after 5 years, equivalent to annual 
discount rates of 14.68% and 20.53%.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics and pairwise correlation coefficients. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
To test whether the differences between the two groups (Monday/time-moving frame, 
and Friday/ego-moving frame) are significant, I calculated the annual discount rate for each 
subject over each of four intervals (one, five, 10, and 20 years). I employed seemingly 
unrelated regression to estimate the association between the frame and discount rates. 
Seemingly unrelated regression is appropriate because, though I estimate a separate equation 
for each delay, the error terms may be correlated across the equations (Zellner, 1962). The 
results are reported in Table 3, showing coefficients, standard errors and p-values. Whilst the 
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coefficient on Friday responses (the ego-moving frame) is positive across all delays, it is 
significantly so across the 5-year (p = 0.035) and 10-year (p = 0.039) delays. A five-year 
delay corresponds to the long-run planning period of most large corporations (Grant, 2003).   
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
In columns IV to VIII, I regress subjects’ discount rates on their temporal frames of 
reference (ego-moving versus time-moving) whilst controlling for individual characteristics. 
Even controlling for covariates, an ego-moving frame remains a significant predictor of high 
discounting over the 5- (p = 0.032) and 10-year (p = 0.035) delays. There is no consistent 
association between having an internal locus of control and the discount rates applied to 
future gains. Further, as per Table 2, the correlation between the locus of control and the ego-
moving frame is insignificant (p = 0.732, using Rotter’s scale, and p = 1.000 using 
Hodgkinson’s scale).   
Overall, then, the ego-moving frame is associated with higher discounting of future 
returns than the time-moving frame for periods of a medium to long delay. This result is 
consistent with the idea that the ego-moving frame is linked to prioritizing the present over 
the future and therefore is consistent with Proposition 1, though it does not provide evidence 
of a causal relationship. I investigate this relationship further in Study 3. 
STUDY 3: FRAMES, LOCUS OF CONTROL, AND DECISION-MAKING 
The aims of Study 3 are 1) to assess support via an experiment for the relationship between 
temporal frames and how people value future returns, and 2) to test the moderating effect of 
control beliefs (Proposition 2).  
Participants and design 
I conducted a study on two cohorts of professionals, each involved in a one-week corporate 
strategy program in London attracting participants primarily from the UK, US, Middle East, 
and East Asia. Across the two cohorts, 105 participants completed the exercise, a business 
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strategy scenario decision, in full. Subjects were experienced (average 9.67 years of business 
experience; s.d. = 4.58), and the most frequent titles were Vice President, Director, and 
Manager. 44 had a background in industry, and 27 in finance. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups. The experimental manipulation 
followed the scheduling task of Hauser et al. (2009). Subjects in group 1 (ego-moving 
condition) were presented with the information: “The company moved its annual shareholder 
meeting forward from March 11 to March 18.” Subjects in group 2 (time-moving condition) 
were presented with the information: “The company moved its annual shareholder meeting 
forward from March 18 to March 11.” Subjects in both groups were asked to reschedule 
identical events, variously described as being moved forwards or backwards, and to list the 
new dates. The events were unrelated to strategy (e.g., “If the Tokyo Olympic Games, which 
are scheduled to be held in 2020, are moved forward one year, in which year will they take 
place?” and “The film Underdogs is expected to be released on April 10. If the release date is 
moved backwards one day, on which day will the film be released?”).  
Subjects then read a scenario about a pharmaceutical firm’s potential acquisition of a 
biotechnology firm (see Table 4), based on the finding of Litov and colleagues (2012) that 
many acquisitions ultimately increase long-term earnings whilst leading firms to miss their 
short-term forecasts. They were asked to advise the CEO. The wording used was: “If you 
advise in favor of the acquisition, the firm will probably miss its short-term earnings forecast 
even if the acquisition leads to earnings increasing in subsequent years.” Subjects indicated 
whether they believed the acquisition would create economic value for the acquirer (1 – 
strongly disagree; 9 – strongly agree). No information on finance restrictions or alternatives 
was provided. The aim was to understand whether subjects viewed a likely NPV-positive 
investment as sensible if it had negative short-term consequences rather than have them 
compare it against explicit alternatives (see Rick and Loewenstein, 2008). Subjects 
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completed Rotter’s (1966) locus of control scale. As a manipulation check at the end of the 
survey, subjects responded to the question: “A meeting scheduled for next Wednesday has 
been moved forward two days. On which day will it now take place?”  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
Results 
The manipulation check confirmed that respondents in the time-moving condition were more 
likely to respond Friday than those in the ego-moving condition (X
2
 (1) = 12.906; p = 0.000).  
The descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations are shown in Table 5 and the 
results of an ordered logit regression analysis in Table 6. The ordered logit specification takes 
account of the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Covariates are included for being a 
native English speaker and for experience in the pharmaceutical sector or in consultancy 
because those subjects might better appreciate the long investment cycles typical in the 
sector
4
. Whilst there is no evidence of a direct effect of time-moving framing on support for 
the acquisition, there is evidence of a significant (p = 0.041) interaction of time-moving 
framing and the locus of control (Model II). This is a moderation rather than a mediation, as 
the time-moving framing has no effect on the locus of control (pairwise correlation = 0.126; p 
= 0.196). This provides support for Proposition 2. Specifically, it implies a cross-over 
interaction: the direction of the effect of the time-moving frame on support for the long-term 
decision depends on the strength of the locus of control.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 and Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------- 
In Figure 4, I plot the degree of support by treatment (time-moving frame, ego-
moving frame) and by locus of control (internal, operationalized as having an internal score 
                                                          
4
 The results are also robust to including fixed effects for other professional backgrounds (finance,  services, 
and technology) as well as to including no individual-level controls. 
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on the Rotter scale one or more standard deviations above the mean, and external, 
operationalized by a score at least one standard deviation below the mean). The odds ratio of 
the interaction term internal locus x time-moving cue is 1.190, implying that for a one unit 
increase in the interaction variable (mean: 0.295; standard deviation: 2.116), the odds of 
showing a high level of support for the long-term investment versus lower levels of support 
become 19% greater. For an increase of one standard deviation in the interaction variable—
approximately equivalent to an increase of four units in Rotter’s 23-level locus of control 
scale—the odds of showing a high level of support versus lower levels of support become 
40.20% greater.    
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 The above estimations of the coefficients and odds ratios rest on the proportional odds 
assumption, i.e. that coefficients do not vary according to the level of the dependent variable. 
I check this assumption by performing a likelihood ratio test of the proportionality of odds, 
where the null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the coefficients across levels. The 
test obtains a X
2
 (36) value of 39.18 (p = 0.329), implying that the proportional odds 
assumption is not violated. A second test, the Brant test, simultaneously conducts multiple 
regressions on the dependent variable, each for a different level of the outcome. To conduct 
this test, I reclassify the dependent variable into quintiles, each with an equivalent number of 
observations for statistical power considerations (Bartholomew, Knott, and Moustaki, 2011). 
The Brant test obtains values of X
2
(3) 4.63 (p = 0.201) for the time-moving treatment, 0.84 (p 
= 0.893) for the locus of control, and 0.46 (p = 0.927) for the interaction, providing support 
that the variables do not violate the proportional odds assumption. 
Additional analyses 
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To support the insight that the time-moving frame prompts attention to the future, after 
completing the previous decision, subjects received the target’s earnings forecasts (Year 1 
forecast = - $10 million EBIT, Year 2 forecast = $0 EBIT, Year 3 forecast = $10 million 
EBIT, Year 4 forecast = $20 million EBIT, and Year 5 forecast = $40 million EBIT). 
Subjects indicated the maximum sum they would offer for the target if the acquirer insisted 
on the deal. 98 subjects provided values. The mean offer of subjects in the time-moving 
condition was $394.04 million (s.d. = 817.42). That of subjects in the ego-moving condition 
was $215.86 million (s.d. = 170.97). The square root of the amounts was taken to reduce the 
positive skewness. A two-way ANOVA reveals that the main effect on the sum offered of 
being in the time-moving condition is significant (F(2,94) = 4.98, p = 0.028; partial η2: 
0.050). There is no effect of having an internal locus of control (operationalized as being 
above the sample mean on the Rotter scale) (F(2,94) = 2.32; p = 0.131; partial η2: 0.024) on 
the amount offered. In other words, whilst the locus of control prompts support for action, it 
does not directly influence how future rewards are valued in the present. In sum, the temporal 
frame shapes how future returns are weighed in the present, but taking long-term action also 
requires a sense of control over achieving the desired returns.  
Though the experiment used random assignment, individual-level differences could 
still be in part responsible for the difference in responses. Might cognitive characteristics 
explain part of this difference? In one of the two cohorts, subjects’ views, in the form of 
open-ended responses, were collected on the proposed acquisition. Consistent with the 
cognitive-linguistic lens, I used the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC, Pennebaker 
et al., 2015) dictionary to code the responses. The LIWC identifies validated categories of 
words that relate to psychological processes. It measures each category as a proportion of the 
total number of words in the text, thereby controlling for length. There exist two important 
meta-categories: analytic thinking and cognitive processing. Analytic thinking denotes 
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breaking problems down into conceptual categories, and its linguistic markers include 
conjunctions, prepositions, and articles. Analytic thinking predicts intelligence and low 
impulsiveness (Pennebaker et al., 2014). Cognitive processing involves the effort to 
understand appropriate responses to problems, and its linguistic markers include verbs such 
as ‘think,’ ‘believe,’ and ‘know’ (Pennebaker et al., 2015), which imply deliberation.  
Coefficients for analytic thinking and cognitive processing are included in Model III
5
. 
The coefficient on analytic thinking is positive (p = 0.001). This supports an association 
between analytic thinking and the tendency to override desires for short-term gain. The 
coefficient on cognitive processing is negative. One plausible explanation is that cognitive 
processing is high when people lack confidence in their response (Pennebaker et al., 2014), 
whereby high levels of cognitive processing reflect uncertainty—in which case not opting for 
the long-term action is the safer course. Importantly, the coefficient on the time-moving 
frame x internal locus interaction term remains positive (p = 0.003).   
Finally, though executives cannot easily shape subordinates’ locus of control, framing 
can influence control beliefs about specific issues. One means is by framing events as 
opportunities or threats. Opportunities are situations in which “gain is likely and over which 
one has a fair amount of control” whereas threats are situations in which “loss is likely and 
over which one has relatively little control” (Dutton and Jackson, 1987: 80). As an extension, 
I report a supplementary study in Appendix 1. This study assesses how framing influences 
the reactions of 126 finance professionals, who might make investments or investment 
recommendations, to descriptions of a firm’s potential investments. The study finds a positive 
interaction between the time-moving frame and opportunity frame on support for the future-
oriented investment (p = 0.017). Thus, market participants approve long-term strategies 
                                                          
5
 There is no discernible relationship between these variables and the treatment. The pairwise correlation 
between the time-moving treatment and analytic reasoning is 0.144 (p = 0.303). That between the time-
moving treatment and cognitive processing is -0.071 (p = 0.614). 
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communicated using time-moving language and a frame invoking the firm’s control over 
future outcomes. This finding, consistent with the results of Study 3, also highlights that 
market actors are subject to similar framing influences as managers and draws attention to the 
response of financial markets to firms’ language use.  
DISCUSSION 
Strategy is a “longitudinal problem” (Porter, 1991): Maximizing short-term returns can be 
inconsistent with achieving sustainable competitive advantage, with manager psychology and 
capital market expectations often producing a suboptimal focus on the short term. This paper 
proposes that managers make sense of time in terms of the physical realities of motion and 
space. Temporal frames of reference, i.e. analogies between time and space, offer a novel 
explanation for temporal reasoning. The findings raise a dilemma for strategy: strategists 
emphasize agency in their discourse, but decisions focused on the long term are fostered by a 
fine balance between recognizing the inevitability of the future (time-moving frame) and the 
capacity to influence future results (control beliefs).   
A cognitive-linguistic explanation of intertemporal choice 
Much strategy research views devising appropriate incentives as an obvious means to manage 
the trade-off between the short term and long term despite mixed evidence that stock options 
with long vesting periods produce investments that are appropriate for long-term returns. 
Ironically, thanks to developments in behavioral economics, economists have long accepted a 
less rationalistic view of how decision-makers address this trade-off
6
.  
The lens of cognitive linguistics is apt to inform how strategists make decisions about 
short- and long-term trade-offs. This lens unpacks the psychological processes that underlie 
language production and meaning. Agentic language is prevalent in strategy discourse about 
                                                          
6
 For example, between 1980 and 2012 the American Economic Review published 68 articles mentioning 
hyperbolic discounting, often cited as evidence of investor irrationality because it leads to dynamically 
inconsistent preferences. During the same interval the Strategic Management Journal published only one 
article (Souder and Bromiley, 2012) referring to the same phenomenon. 
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the future. Yet, the studies suggest that executives weigh long-term returns more heavily 
when they acknowledge a balance between the inevitable advent of the future (i.e. the time-
moving frame) and their capacity to influence future outcomes. Moreover, as discussed 
below, discourse has consequences: it sways the impressions of internal audiences, such as 
middle managers, and external audiences, including investors.  
The cognitive-linguistic lens advances efforts to ground strategic theory in realistic 
assumptions about decision-making. Specifically, temporal frames of reference denote that 
time is perceived spatially, underpinning the link between strategic thought and physical 
processes (Gylfe et al., 2015). Whilst most effects documented in this paper apply to the level 
of the individual decision-maker, discourse is socially constituted. There are organizational 
differences in how the future is described (Study 1). Thus, managers’ locus of control can 
have different effects across organizational contexts. When the future is framed as time-
moving, perceptions of control over outcomes foster support for long-term strategies. 
Individual-level constructs, such as temporal orientation, have been considered to be stable 
(Das and Teng, 2001), with some executives inherently more future-oriented than others. Yet, 
stable individual characteristics by themselves appear insufficient to explain responses.  
Practical implications: Communicating internally and externally 
The research speaks directly to executives grappling with making strategy decisions for the 
long term. Already a rich body of evidence investigates the positive and negative 
performance implications of focusing on the short or long term. This is not to say that 
executives ought to attend only to the long term. In any firm there may be good reason for 
some managers to attend to the distant future whilst others attend to immediate pressures. But, 
psychological forces and investor expectations can encourage a suboptimal focus on the short 
term (Reilly, Souder, and Ranucci, 2016). Rather than argue that focusing on the long term is 
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always sensible, the point of the present paper is to show that creating a focus towards long-
term results must take account of how organizations and their managers construe time.  
Temporal frames can motivate, or discourage, long-term strategies. An idea raised by 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 3) is that designing organizations involves not only the division of 
labor and coordination, but that it also involves “choice architecture.” Choice architecture 
denotes the—often subliminal ways—in which people are guided by the norms, information, 
rewards, and language of their social context. That many management teams simultaneously 
employ ego-moving discourse and depict control over external circumstances in their calls 
with analysts suggests that this way of communicating strategy is common, setting the 
context for middle-level management. Yet, the consequence could be a focus on the present. 
Executives shape the context for how their subordinates think about time (Ancona et al., 
2001; Mohammed and Nadkarni, 2011). Of course, setting the context does not only involve 
language: temporal leadership also encompasses practices and artefacts that structure time 
(e.g. Orlikowski and Yates, 2002) such as time charts. Ego- and time-moving analogies might 
affect how actors represent time visually. It is of note that many time charts depict time as a 
horizontal flow (similar to Figure 1, with future events positioned on the right side and 
arrows denoting progression). 
Temporal frames also potentially influence the reactions of external audiences. Firms 
use analogies to communicate their strategies to different effects (Glaser, Fiss, and Kennedy, 
2016). Analysts and investors react negatively to many strategies that depress short-term 
earnings even if they have the potential to increase long-term earnings (Litov et al., 2012). 
One explanation for this may be that market actors are subject to similar framing effects as 
managers. A supplementary study (A1, available in the online supporting material) involves 
finance professionals as subjects. It suggests that communicating long-term strategies matters 
for investor perceptions, and that investors are prone to similar framing effects as managers. 
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They are more supportive of investment proposals communicated using a time-moving and 
control-enhancing frame. These insights extend understandings of how firms’ language 
affects market sentiment.  
Extensions and limitations 
The cognitive-linguistic lens lends itself to studying other phenomena by informing 
how managers construe numerous abstract concepts that are core to strategic thinking. In their 
work on alliances, Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) show that the “courtship metaphor” 
structures how executives approach alliance decisions. Similarly, inappropriate analogies 
may provide misdirection to corporate decision-making. More investigation of analogies can 
complement research into decision-making. One extension would be to consider time-related 
metaphors that do not involve space. Metaphors that equate time to money (“time is money”) 
and scarcity (“time famine”) are particularly relevant. There are numerous other intangibles 
in strategic management, e.g. capabilities, reputation, and competition. Resources are often 
illustrated by the bathtub metaphor, whereby the level represents the accumulated stock and 
the flow of water represents resource flows. Such analogies could be studied through the 
same lens with the aim of understanding how they influence decision-making and action.  
Language has potential implications at the macro level too. Time- and ego-moving 
frames exist across languages, but the prevalence of either differs, as do other ways of 
articulating time (Furman and Boroditsky, 2010). Though the relationship between national 
languages and behavior is hotly contested, cross-linguistic differences may matter subtly for 
perception and decision-making (Brandenburger and Vinokurova, 2012). In light of the 
accusation that firms from English-speaking countries are excessively focused on the short 
term, a valuable follow-up study would be to investigate cross-language variation in temporal 
metaphors with the aim of identifying implications for corporate behavior across countries.   
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There are boundary conditions to the present findings. Though research in linguistics 
has examined temporal frames both as an individual characteristic and as an effect that can be 
primed, the time construal primed in the experiments could differ from an individual’s more 
stable inherent usage of either frame in the absence of priming. This speaks to a common 
problem that primes that are effective in controlled settings may be difficult to replicate in the 
field (Doyen et al., 2012). More generally, as strategy research draws increasingly on 
behavioral experiments, issues of designing and analyzing experiments are becoming more 
important. Given the centrality of trade-offs to strategy, discrete choice experiments can 
complement the studies in this paper. When decision-makers consider a long-term 
investment, they do not always explicitly compare it to a range of alternative investments 
(Rick and Loewenstein, 2008). But, financing constraints are real, and discrete choice 
experimental designs hold the promise to uncover the drivers of strategic decisions as well as 
the reactions of firms’ stakeholders under such constraints (Auger and Devinney, 2007).  
This paper ultimately concerns “executive judgment,” which is crucial “in the actual 
conditions of high-stakes, complex problem solving in organizations” (Powell et al., 2011: 
1377). Yet, not all organizational action is explained by the judgments of influential decision-
makers. One mechanism, that can account for similar rates of time-moving language across 
executives of the same firm, is convergence of language. Language often converges towards 
the style of powerful superiors (Giles, Coupland, and Coupland, 1991). Convergence is 
consistent with the pattern observed in Study 1, whereby team members often frame future 
events in the same way as the CEO. An alternative explanation is that managers who construe 
the future in different ways self-select into roles and firms. Longitudinal field studies offer 
one way to assess more fully how management teams construct the future.  
Relatedly, advancing behavioral work in strategy may benefit from ways of analyzing 
data, including experimental data, other than through classical techniques. One particular 
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approach is Bayesian analysis. Bayesian methods are valuable to strategy because they can 
generate individual decision models as well as aggregate models (Wilden, Devinney, and 
Dowling, 2016), offering one way to explain the orientations of individual executives as well 
as organizational action. In a supplementary study (A2, online), I analyze the data using a 
Bayesian approach. I also encourage scholars to triangulate the findings using other methods. 
Field studies that track temporal frames and investments over time would be complementary, 
as would—at the micro level—neuroscientific studies that, whilst not yet common in strategy 
(Laureiro-Martinez, Brusoni, Canessa, and Zollo, 2015), have been used to investigate 
intertemporal choice (Peer et al., 2015) and the links between spatial and temporal reasoning 
(Cooper et al., 2014). 
A final question worth addressing is: Where do temporal frames come from? Some 
events may be more readily represented using one type of frame (Margolies and Crawford, 
2008). In a follow-up study (study A3 in the online supplementary material), I assess whether 
the properties of events—for instance, whether the event is distant in time; whether the event 
is largely controllable—influence the temporal frame that managers employ. I find only 
limited evidence of this. The fact that frames are not determined by event characteristics 
allows for heterogeneity across individuals and firms (as Studies 1 and 2 imply).   
Conclusions 
Analogies between time and space feature prominently in organizational discourse as they 
help executives conceive of time in terms of objects that they experience more concretely. 
Two core ways of mapping time to space (ego-moving versus time-moving frames) are 
associated with distinct ways of construing the future. Time-moving frames make the future 
appear more proximate and, in interaction with control beliefs, underpin support from 
managers and investors for decisions that privilege long-term returns over short-term returns. 
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Figure 1.    Depictions of time- and ego-moving frames of references 
Time-moving temporal frame of reference  
For example, “If there ever comes a day when you and I disagree about the future direction of the 
company…” (Facebook’s letter to shareholders at its IPO)  
 
Ego-moving temporal frame of reference  
For example, “We’ve been driving toward this future for some time.” (AT&T 2013 annual report) 
Figure 2. Sample firms’ ratio of time- to ego-moving language plotted against their R&D ratio over 
the observation period 2002-2011   
  
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Allergan Abbott Elilly BMS Pfizer J&J Perrigo Mylan Hospira Merck
Time-to-ego R&D ratio
36 
 
Figure 3. Study 2: Indifference amounts ($) after 1, 5, 10, and 20 years 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Study 3: Interaction of temporal frame of reference and locus of control in predicting 
support for acquisition with negative consequences for short-term earnings  
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Error bars show standard errors of the means. 
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Table 1.   Sample firms 
Firm Business R&D expenditure 
to sales ratio (2002 
to 2011) 
Asset4 social 
score (average, 
2002-2011) 
Ratio of time- 
to ego-moving 
language 
Dominant modality in time-moving language  
Eli Lilly Research-intensive 
pharmaceuticals 
19.82% 90.90 0.38 Ability: “These demonstrate our focus on addressing our upcoming 
patent expiration through innovation.” (IR executive, 2010) 
Merck Research-intensive 
pharmaceuticals 
18.45% 92.79 0.08 Uncertainty: “We are withdrawing the guidance. We have not put 
new guidance in because there are some important events coming 
up.” (CEO, 2010) 
Allergan Research-intensive 
pharmaceuticals 
16.45% 39.64 0.57 Ability: “Every week and month that goes by, there is upside versus 
our plans.” (CEO, 2002) 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
Research-intensive 
pharmaceuticals 
14.96% 93.27 0.26 Ability: “This is a very good moment… I’m confident that we’ll also 
continue to see it in the years to come.” (CSO, 2006)  
Pfizer Research-intensive 
pharmaceuticals 
14.73% 76.42 0.23 Ability: “As (smoking) bans come into place, it creates a lot more 
marketplace for us.” (President Worldwide, 2008) 
Johnson & Johnson Diversified business 
with devices and 
consumer products 
divisions 
11.78% 94.86 0.22 Ability: “We are actively participating in the dialogues on public 
policy that will shape our business environment for years to come.” 
(Chairman, 2008) 
Abbott Pharmaceutical business 
with devices and 
generics divisions 
9.47% 88.92 0.73 Uncertainty: “I want to see a quarter or two play out and see how all 
of this flows.” (CEO, 2003) 
Mylan Pharmaceutical business 
specializing in generics 
6.30% 22.75 0.16 Uncertainty: “We can never predict what circumstances and 
variables that we as management and the board of directors would 
have to be faced with at the time an approval would come.” (CEO, 
2003) 
Hospira Pharmaceutical business 
specializing in generics 
and devices 
6.07% 69.42 0.15 Uncertainty: “That approval will come this year or next year.” 
(COO, 2006) 
Perrigo Pharmaceutical business 
specializing in generics 
3.61% 23.72 0.21 Uncertainty: “I’m not sure what the future will bring.” (President, 
2004) 
 
During the period of observation (2002-2011), Hospira was an independent company. It was acquired by Pfizer in 2015.  
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Table 2.  Study 1: Correlation table.  
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co
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St
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H
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h
y
Ego-moving frame 0.453 0.499 .
Year 1 discount 1.811 7.05 0.078 .
0.327
Year 5 discount 0.266 0.341 0.165 0.720 .
0.037 0.000
Year 10 discount 0.173 0.181 0.161 0.591 0.946 .
0.042 0.000 0.000
Year 20 discount 0.106 0.098 0.105 0.480 0.818 0.925 .
0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000
Internal  locus 13.572 4.271 -0.027 0.018 -0.089 -0.102 -0.079 .
0.732 0.822 0.266 0.201 0.324
Strategic locus 38.094 7.155 0.000 -0.031 -0.062 -0.073 -0.082 -0.470 .
1.000 0.702 0.442 0.363 0.306 0.000
Hierarchy 2.478 1.036 -0.117 -0.017 -0.071 -0.079 -0.111 0.084 -0.088 .
0.141 0.830 0.371 0.322 0.163 0.295 0.270
Education 2.038 0.674 -0.032 -0.101 -0.105 -0.092 -0.060 -0.032 -0.022 0.219
0.686 0.207 0.187 0.247 0.451 0.691 0.786 0.006
P-values are shown below the correlation coefficients. 
Table 3. Study 1: SUR regression predicting discount rates 
I . Yr 1 
discount
II. Yr 5 
discount
III . Yr 10 
discount
IV. Yr 20 
discount
V. Yr 1 
discount
VI. Yr 5 
discount
VII. Yr 10 
discount
VIII. Yr 20 
discount
Time-moving 1.104 0.112 0.058 0.021 1.079 0.115 0.060 0.023
(1.116) (0.053) (0.028) (0.191) (1.121) (0.054) (0.028) (0.011)
p = 0.322 p = 0.035 p = 0.039 p = 0.183 p = 0.336 p = 0.032 p = 0.035 p = 0.309
Internal  locus 0.029 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002
(0.131) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
p = 0.824 p = 0.295 p = 0.230 p = 0.391
Hierarchica l  pos i tion -0.44 -0.021 -0.013 -0.011
(0.556) (0.026) (0.014) (0.008)
p = 0.936 p = 0.268 p = 0.0354 p = 0.168
Education -1.007 -0.045 -0.020 -0.005
(0.846) (0.040) (0.021) (0.002)
p = 0.234 p = 0.268 p = 0.355 p = 0.669
Constant 1.311 0.215 0.215 0.097 4.097 0.491 0.292 0.158
(0.751) (0.036) (0.036) (0.010) (3.265) (0.155) (0.082) (0.045)
p = 0.081 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.209 p = 0.002 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
X2 0.98 4.46 4.25 1.77 2.60 8.17 8.16 5.23
R squared 0.006 0.034 0.036 0.017 0.016 0.049 0.049 0.032  
When Hodgkinson’s (1992) measure of strategic locus of control is used instead of Rotter’s (1966) locus of 
control scale, the coefficient on the time-moving frame remains significant over the five- (p = 0.028) and 10-
year (p = 0.030) delays.
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Table 4.  Decision scenario  
Text for study 3 
A pharmaceutical corporation has the chance to acquire a smaller biotechnology company. 
The biotechnology company is developing a treatment for Parkinson’s disease, having 
already gained relevant compound patents. Parkinson's disease is a neurodegenerative 
disease, for which there is no cure or therapy yet available. Assume that the proposed price 
of the acquisition is in line with other acquisitions in the pharmaceutical sector. 
  
This acquisition will be disruptive for the company as a whole. The launch of any drug for 
Parkinson's disease is at least one or two years away. As a result, if you advise in favor of 
the acquisition, the firm will probably miss its short-term earnings forecast even if the 
acquisition leads to earnings increasing in subsequent years.  
 
Table 5. Study 3: Correlation Table 
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Support for decision 6.879 1.697 
       
          Internal locus 13.112 4.05 0.171 
      
   
0.079 
      Time moving condition 0.486 0.502 -0.030 0.126 
     
   
0.762 0.196 
     English speaker 0.438 0.499 0.046 -0.243 0.081 
    
   
0.640 0.013 0.414 
    Pharma experience 0.028 0.166 -0.155 0.066 -0.165 -0.036 
   
   
0.113 0.503 0.089 0.714 
   Consulting experience 0.112 0.317 0.131 0.020 -0.227 -0.076 0.119 
  
   
0.180 0.842 0.019 0.442 0.222 
  Analytic thinking 75.012 28.597 0.373 -0.051 0.144 0.066 -0.031 0.088 
 
   
0.006 0.716 0.303 0.637 0.824 0.532 
 Cognitive processes 12.561 7.118 -0.360 -0.070 -0.071 0.269 -0.144 -0.122 -0.153 
   
0.008 0.617 0.614 0.051 0.304 0.384 0.276 
 
P-values are shown below the correlation coefficients. 
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Table 6.  Study 3: Results (ordered logit regression)  
    
DV: 
Support 
for 
Investment 
  
VARIABLES I II III 
        
Time-moving condition 0.306 0.222 -0.516 
  (0.374) (0.374) (0.613) 
  p = 0.412 p = 0.554 p = 0.400 
Locus of control 0.069 0.075 0.084 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.063) 
  p = 0.137 p = 0.103 p = 0.179 
Time-moving condition *    0.174 0.402 
locus of control   (0.085) (0.135) 
    p = 0.041 p = 0.003 
Analytic thinking     0.037 
      (0.012) 
      p = 0.001 
Cognitive processes     -0.153 
      (0.045) 
      p = 0.001 
Native English speaker -0.718 -0.814 -0.808 
  (0.373) (0.377) (0.595) 
  p = 0.054 p = 0.031 p = 0.174 
Pharma experience 0.762 0.782 -0.238 
  (1.23) (1.192) (1.160) 
  p = 0.535 p = 0.511 p = 0.837 
Consulting 0.697 0.852 0.105 
experience (0.569) (0.576) (1.014) 
  p = 0.221 p = 0.139 p = 0.917 
Observations 105 105 53 
Pseudo R-squared 0.027 0.039 0.192 
LR χ2  9.81 14.00 30.89 
        
        
Standard errors in parentheses       
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SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY A1 
 
TIME FRAMES AND CONTROL BELIEFS IN CORPORATE COMMUNICATION 
 
 
Though executives cannot easily shape their subordinates’ locus of control as this tends to be 
stable, framing can influence control beliefs about specific issues. As an extension, I assess 
how different framings influenced the inclination to engage in long-term investments. In 
doing so, I seek to identify how finance professionals, i.e. those who might make investments 
or investment recommendations, respond to distinct descriptions of a firm’s potential 
investments. One reason for doing so is that the trade-off between maximizing short- and 
long-term earnings is intensified by investors’ negative reactions to firms’ announcements of 
long-term strategies that depress short-term earnings (Litov et al, 2012). 
The future is commonly framed as an opportunity or threat, whereby the same event 
can be construed in either way. Perceived control is core to the distinction between 
opportunities and threats (George et al., 2006). Specifically, opportunities are situations in 
which “gain is likely and over which one has a fair amount of control” whereas threats are 
situations in which “loss is likely and over which one has relatively little control” (Dutton 
and Jackson, 1987: 80). Similar to control beliefs, the positive attributes of situations framed 
as opportunities prompt approach (Dantzig, Zeelenberg, and Pecher, 2009). Likewise, just as 
an external locus of control can prompt avoidance (Kramer and Yoon, 2007), low perceived 
control over the outcomes of threats provokes timid actions (Dutton and Jackson, 1987). 
Though the distinction between gains and losses in opportunity-threat framing is also 
associated with prospect theory, prospect theory is less relevant to evaluating returns from 
future projects insofar as people seek to eliminate uncertainty in both gains and losses 
(Hardistry and Pfeffer, 2016).  
 
Participants and design 
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Partnering with Survey Sampling International and Qualtrics Panels, I recruited 126 finance 
professionals (mean age = 36.15 years; standard deviation = 10.91): analysts, bankers, 
corporate finance managers, and insurance professionals. I used two partners on account of 
the specialist population targeted. Similar to Qualtrics Panels, Survey Sampling International 
has access to specialist subject pools (Apfelbaum, Stephens, and Reagans, 2016). Subjects 
were working in the USA (114) or the UK (12). 70.63% of the managers had a university 
degree. 23.81% had a postgraduate qualification. 95.24% were native English speakers. 
I designed a 2x2 factorial experiment. Subjects responded to a survey administered 
online with appropriate attention checks (Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Subjects were informed 
that a pharmaceutical firm’s best-selling drug was coming off patent, and that the company 
faced the choice between 1) investing more in research to develop new drugs, and 2) 
licensing drugs from other firms to resell. The intertemporal trade-off inherent in investing in 
research and development was made clear: whilst research and development might increase 
future earnings, the increase in expenditure by a magnitude of 40% per annum would mean 
that no dividends would be paid in the subsequent two years. This trade-off is symptomatic of 
value-creating strategies that depress short-term earnings. 
Subjects were randomly assigned between two conditions. The first treatment was the 
temporal frame of reference. In the time-moving condition, subjects were informed that the 
date of the patent expiration was approaching. In the ego-moving condition, respondents were 
informed that the firm was approaching the date of the patent expiration. Interpreting time- 
and ego-moving language involves mental simulation of motion (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). I 
expected, and found in pilot tests, that reading such a prompt would foster a time- or ego-
moving frame. The second treatment was the opportunity-threat framing. In the opportunity 
condition, the expiration of the patent was described as an opportunity because the firm had a 
successful record of drug development (i.e. consistent with Dutton and Jackson’s (1987) 
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definition of opportunity as being about both gains and control). In the threat condition, the 
expiration of the patent was described as a challenge because the firm would have to try to 
minimize loss and there was no guarantee that drug development would be successful (i.e. 
consistent with Dutton and Jackson’s definition of threat as being about both losses and 
limited control)
7
.  
Subjects indicated on a 1-7 Likert scale the degree to which they believed that 
investing in developing new drugs made sense for the firm in the future. I collected 
demographic information, including subjects’ locus of control using Rotter’s (1966) scale. In 
this study the locus of control is used as a control variable. The central interest lies in the 
influence of opportunity framing, which can affect how investors perceive the ability of the 
focal firm’s managers to achieve expected earnings but is not expected to affect investors’ 
personal control perceptions. Subjects explained in open-ended text their reasons for 
supporting, or not supporting, the investment in developing new drugs as opposed to the 
cheaper alternative of selling drugs under licence.  
 
Results 
Consistent with the manipulation check of Hauser et al. (2009), subjects in the time-moving 
treatment were more likely to conceive of the patent expiration as approaching as opposed to 
the firm approaching the date of the patent expiration (X
2
(1) = 31.187; p = 0.000). Subjects in 
the opportunity condition were significantly more likely to refer to gains when explaining 
their choices (t = -2.089; p = 0.039; using the LIWC continuous measure of reward-based 
language) and were also less likely to note the firm’s lack of control over the likelihood of 
successful development (X
2
(1) = 5.352; p = 0.021). 
                                                          
7
 Consistent with the operationalization of threat as involving likely loss and low control and opportunity as 
involving likely gain and high control (Dutton and Jackson, 1987), I do not examine loss/gain and high 
control/low control separately. Empirical research confirms that perceptions of loss and low control are 
inherently related, as are perceptions of gain and high control (Mittal and Ross, 1998).  
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I conduct an ordered logit regression. I show descriptive statistics in Table A1-1 and 
the results in Table A1-2, including coefficients, standard errors and exact p-values. There is 
a positive interaction between the time-moving frame and opportunity frame on support for 
the future-oriented investment (p = 0.017). The relationship still holds after controlling for 
the locus of control and, in Model III, for analytic reasoning and cognitive processing. 
Analytic reasoning and cognitive processing were measured using the LIWC as in Study 3. 
The percentage change in odds for an increase of one standard deviation in the interaction 
term time-moving frame x opportunity frame is 48.90%. In Figure A1-1, I plot the degree of 
support by temporal frame (time-moving vs. ego-moving) and by opportunity vs. threat frame. 
This Figure demonstrates the cross-over interaction: whereas the time-moving frame is 
associated with greater support for the long-term investment when it is combined with the 
opportunity frame, the ego-moving frame is associated with greater support when it is 
combined with the threat frame.   
In sum, there is greater support for a long-term strategy when it is communicated 
using an opportunity frame than a threat frame, but only when it is framed in time-moving 
language. Similar to Study 3, this finding is consistent with a view of the inevitability of the 
future (time-moving frame) and the capacity of the firm to shape future outcomes (control 
beliefs inherent in the opportunity frame). It also raises interesting implications for firms’ 
communication choices.  
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Table A1-1: Descriptive Statistics 
   Mean  S.D. 
Support 
for 
investment 
Time-
moving 
condition 
Opportunity 
frame 
Locus 
of 
control 
Analytic 
thinking 
Cognitive 
Processes 
Support for investment 5.444 1.256             
                  
Time-moving condition 0.492 0.501 -0.045           
      0.616           
Opportunity frame 0.484 0.502 0.049 0.000         
      0.583 1.000         
Locus of control 11.849 3.718 0.145 0.109 0.014       
      0.106 0.226 0.879       
Analytic thinking 63.538 36.381 0.081 -0.110 -0.104 0.086     
      0.369 0.219 0.246 0.338     
Cognitive processes 16.712 12.586 -0.043 -0.175 -0.077 -0.105 -0.195   
      0.630 0.050 0.390 0.243 0.028   
P-values are shown below the correlation coefficients. 
Table A1-2: Results (Ordered Logit regression)  
                                                      DV: Support for investment   
 
I II III 
Time-moving condition -0.295 -0.285 -0.355 
 
(0.329) (0.331) (0.341) 
 
p = 0.370 p = 0.389 p = 0.298 
Locus of control -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 
 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) 
 
p = 0.952 p = 0.808 p = 0.819 
Opportunity frame -0.165 -0.166 -0.226 
 
(0.326) (0.327) (0.334) 
 
p = 0.613 p = 0.612 p = 0.499 
Time-moving condition *  
 
1.587 1.651 
Opportunity frame 
 
(0.664) (0.672) 
  
p = 0.017 p = 0.014 
Analytic thinking 
  
-0.003 
   
(0.004) 
   
p = 0.574 
Cognitive processes 
  
-0.012 
   
(0.014) 
   
p = 0.383 
Native English speaker -1.007 -1.066 -1.044 
 
(0.771) (0.753) -0.759 
 
p = 0.192 p = 0.157 p = 0.169 
Observations 126 126 126 
Pseudo R-squared (Cos-Snell/ML) 0.020 0.065 0.071 
LR χ2  2.58 8.41 9.29 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
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Figure A1-1. Support for long-term investment in researching new drugs with negative consequences 
on short-term earnings 
 
 
 
 
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
6
6.2
ego-moving time-moving
threat opportunity
48 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY A2 
 
BAYESIAN ANALYSIS 
 
Bayesian estimation is often employed in studies that investigate within-subject learning and 
that track, for example, how people respond to cycles of stimuli (e.g. Seo, Goldfarb and 
Barrett, 2010). But, more generally, Bayesian inference can also be suitable for assessing data 
from one-shot experiments and in complementing frequentist methods (i.e. ANOVA, 
regression).  
In essence, “Bayesian inference is merely the reallocation of credibility across a space 
of candidate possibilities” (Krusche, 2013: 574). In this way, Bayesian inference may have 
advantages over conventional null-hypothesis testing in terms of interpreting data. One 
specific advantage is that Bayesian analysis allows for the graded evidence for effects as 
opposed to the more conventional dichotomous reject and fail-to-reject decisions of 
frequentist methods. Thus, in the case of experiments, Bayesian analysis can thus be useful 
for acknowledging variance across subjects. For this reason, Rouder and Morey (2012) 
recommend reporting Bayesian statistics as additional evidence in some cases. The core value 
comes from being able to estimate a posterior distribution and a range of values—the credible 
interval—to which a parameter can reasonably be assigned.  
 
Participants and Design 
The data set is identical to that described in Study 3. 105 participants in a one-week corporate 
strategy program completed a business strategy scenario decision. Each was randomly 
assigned to one of two groups (ego-moving condition vs. time-moving condition). The 
scenario concerned a pharmaceutical firm’s potential acquisition of a biotechnology firm, 
which might lead the acquirer to miss its short-term earnings forecasts but might lead to an 
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increase in earnings in subsequent years. Subjects provided demographic information and 
completed a locus of control scale. For more details, please refer to Study 3. 
Analysis and Results 
I replicate the analysis of Study 3 using a Bayesian specification to assess the range of most 
credible values for the core interaction term time-moving treatment x locus of control. To fit 
the Bayesian model, I use noninformative (Jeffrey’s) priors. So-called noninformative priors 
are usually employed when little is known about the data. In this particular instance, though a 
case might be made that the qualitative analysis provides some useful information, I use 
noninformative priors and do not “direct” the analysis to a desired outcome. The use of 
noninformative priors leaves maximum uncertainty about the parameter values.  
I use 2,500 burn-in iterations and 10,000 subsequent Monte Carlo Markov chain 
iterations to generate the results. The analysis produces a complete posterior distribution of 
the credibility of all possible parameter values given the data set at hand. The results are 
shown in Table A2-1. These results display the posterior means for each coefficient, the 
standard deviations, and the 95% credible intervals. The 95% credibility interval for the core 
interaction in the analysis (time-moving x internal locus) is entirely within the positive range. 
This implies that an effect size of zero is not credible given the data. It is also worth pointing 
out that the 95% credibility interval for the net effect of an internal locus is predominantly in 
the positive range. 
I plot in Figure A2-1 the posterior distribution of credible values of the time-moving x 
internal locus of control interaction term. The figure displays the density plots for the full 
Monte Carlo Markov chain sample, the first half of the chain, and the second half of the chain. 
The density is similar across both halves of the chain.  
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Figure A2-1. Posterior distribution of the mean for the coefficient time-moving treatment x internal 
locus of control 
 
 
 
 
Table A2-1. Study A2: Posterior estimates  
 
  Posterior estimates: Support for investment 
 
Posterior mean Posterior SD 95% CI 
Time-moving condition 0.048 0.345 [-0.601; 0.752] 
Locus of control 0.081 0.042 [-0.005; 0.164] 
Time-moving condition * locus of control 0.153 0.077 [0.001; 0.302] 
Native English speaker -0.413 0.365 [-1.123; 0.348] 
Pharma experience 0.615 1.006 [-1.425; 2.429] 
Consulting experience 0.732 0.527 [-0.279; 1.741] 
Constant 5.827 0.636 [4.577; 7.129] 
Observations 105     
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SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY A3 
 
 
INVESTIGATING REVERSE CAUSALITY: DO SCENARIO ATTRIBUTES 
INFLUENCE THE USE OF TIME- AND EGO-MOVING FRAMES? 
 
Study 3 and supplementary study A1 imply a relationship between temporal frames of 
reference and the kinds of decisions that managers take when there is a conflict between 
maximizing short-term earnings and maximizing long-term earnings. However, are some 
situations inherently more likely to be framed using a time-moving frame? If, for example, 
the long term is inherently framed using time-moving language, the relationship between 
temporal frames of reference and decision-making might be bidirectional. To assess this, I 
adopt the approach of Hauser and colleagues (2009) who show, on the one hand, that time-
moving and ego-moving frames prompt different perceptions of agency and, on the other 
hand, that prompting people to perceive greater agency influenced whether they employ a 
time-moving or ego-moving frame. Similarly, Margolies and Crawford (2008) find that 
positive events are somewhat more likely to be interpreted using an ego-moving frame 
whereas negative events, such as threats, are more often interpreted using a time-moving 
frame. 
The question here is, therefore: Is the temporal frame employed determined by the 
nature of the scenario? I conduct a study whereby I manipulate the event’s time horizon and 
associated control beliefs (with investments framed as opportunities more linked to 
perceptions of control than those framed as threats). The experimental design is consistent 
with experiments in cognitive linguistics, whereby I prompt subjects with textual descriptions 
that differ along the dimensions of interest and subsequently identify whether subjects find 
the time- or ego-moving description of the future more natural than the other.   
 
Design and Procedure 
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I partnered with Qualtrics Panels to recruit 101 business managers (mean age = 36.64 years, 
standard deviation = 10.67), all resident in the United States of America and 95 of whom 
were native speakers of English.  
I adopted a 2x2 full factorial design. I employed the scenario of supplementary study 
A1, whereby a pharmaceutical firm’s most important patent would expire and thus the firm 
faced the decision whether to invest in developing drugs for the future or could sell 
competitors’ drugs under licence. I avoided time- and ego-moving language and introduced 
two treatments.  
First, the timing of the future event was manipulated. Subjects in the short-term 
condition were informed that the patent would expire “in the immediate future (early 2017).” 
This time period was chosen as it was under a year away from the data collection in the 
summer of 2016. A period of under one year represents the short-term as per the accounting 
and finance literature. Subjects in the long-term condition were informed that the patent 
would expire “in five years’ time (2021).” The period of five years represents the maximum 
planning horizon of most firms (Grant, 1996).  
Second, the event was described as an opportunity or as a threat. Subjects in the 
opportunity condition were informed that “For this new era, we have to decide whether to 
increase our investment in research and development of new drugs. We view this juncture as 
an opportunity to grow our profits because we have a successful record of developing drugs.” 
Subjects in the threat condition were informed that “For this new competitive era we have to 
decide whether to increase our investment in research and development of new drugs so that 
our future profits do not fall.” These descriptions were based on Dutton and Jackson’s (1987) 
definition of opportunities as issues that comprise potential gain and perceived control and 
threats as issues that comprise potential loss and lack of control. The explicit alternative to 
investing in research and development was to sell other companies’ drugs under licence. 
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 Consistent with Hauser and colleagues, to identify whether subjects associated the 
scenario with a time- or ego-moving frame, subjects were asked whether they perceived a 
new era to be approaching the firm (i.e. time-moving) or whether they perceived the firm as 
approaching a new era (i.e. ego-moving). Demographic data were collected, and the locus of 
control was measured using Rotter’s (1966) scale.  
 
Results 
Across the 101 subjects, 52 perceived the firm to be approaching the event (ego-moving), and 
49 perceived the event to be approaching the firm (time-moving). Chi-square tests reveal no 
relationship between being in the short-term condition and the perception of the event 
approaching (X
2
(1) = 0.808; p = 0.369). Nor is there a relationship between being in the 
opportunity condition and the perception of the event approaching (X
2
(1) =  0.008; p = 0.928). 
The results of a probit analysis are presented in Table A3-1, which includes relevant controls 
to predict whether subjects interpreted the scenario through an ego-moving frame.  
The finding of no evident relationship between features of the scenario (long- versus 
short-term; opportunity, implying control and potential gain, versus threat, implying lower 
control and potential loss) and the temporal frame employed reinforces the potential causal 
effect of temporal frames on actors’ decision-making. This is not to deny the findings of 
Hauser et al. (2009) and Margolies and Crawford (2008) that temporal frames can also be 
shaped by the scenario. Those prior studies used differences in scenarios that were arguably 
more extreme (e.g. neutral scenarios versus ones intended to induce anger) than those tested 
here that are intended to mimic the more ambiguous scenarios that confront management. 
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Table A3-1. Study A3: Results (probit regression)  
 
 
DV: Ego-moving frame
VARIABLES I II III
Short-term -0.275 -0.274 -0.276
(0.255) (0.251) (0.256)
p = 0.282 p = 0.283 p = 0.281
Opportunity frame -0.019 -0.018 -0.036
(0.251) (0.251) -0.253
p = 0.940 p = 0.942 p = 0.888
Short-term * opportunity 
frame
-0.228 -0.191
(0.503) (0.506)
p = 0.651 p = 0.707
Locus of control 0.027
(0.036)
p = 0.454
Native English speaker 0.603 0.587 0.608
(0.558) (0.560) (0.566)
p = 0.279 p = 0.294 p = 0.283
Constant -0.383 -0.368 -0.719
(0.548) (0.550) (0.728)
p = 0.485 p = 0.503 p = 0.324
Observations 101 101 101
R-squared 0.014 0.016 0.02
Likelihood Ratio Chi2 2.02 (3) 2.23 (4) 2.79 (5)
Standard errors in 
parentheses  
 
 
 
